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The unionisation of the South African Military Forces has tested both 
lawyers and the South African legal system. However, there is very little academic 
commentary on this important subject. In this article, the policy, which allowed the 
unionisation of the South African military, the influence of the policy on national 
security, and the reasons why the policy failed, are discussed. It is argued that, in 
the South African context, allowing unions in the Defence Force was a big mistake. 
Such conduct has sacrificed the country’s national security at the altar of soldiers’ 
right to form and join labour unions. Unions have polarised the military – their 
propensity to embark on labour actions or threats to embark on such actions 
undermines the country’s national security.  
An analysis is made on whether or not the Constitutional Court erred in 
interpreting certain provisions of the Constitution, especially section 23(2), which 
states, “every worker has the right to form and join a trade union, to participate in 
the activities and programmes of a trade union and to strike.” This will be done by 
examining some constitutional and legislative provisions, which deal with the 
Defence Force. An argument will be made as to whether members of any 
organisation may really be classified as workers. It will be respectfully argued that 
the Constitutional Court misdirected itself in interpreting the word ‘workers’ in 
section 23(2) of the Constitution to include members of the Defence Force. Lastly, 
it is argued that in the South African context, 
allowing unions in the Defence Force has 
proved to be an Achilles’ heel. 
Recommendations are made about steps the 
country should take to ensure that military 
forces are not unionised.  
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Introduction 
Before the emergence of democracy in South Africa in 1994, members of 
the former Defence Force were prohibited from becoming members of trade 
unions. For instance, section 126B(1) of the Defence Act1 provided : 
A member of the Permanent Force shall not be or become a member of any 
trade union as defined in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 (Act 
28 of 1956): Provided that this provision shall not preclude any member of 
such Force from being or becoming a member of any professional or 
vocational institute, society, association or like body approved by the 
Minister.  
The new South African Constitution guarantees the right of every worker 
to form and join a trade union2 and to participate in the activities and programmes 
of a trade union3 and to strike.4 With the new democratic dispensation and the 
coming into existence of the new Constitution things changed and members of the 
new Defence Force were allowed to form and join trade unions. In 1999, in South 
African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence and Other,5 the 
Constitutional Court interpreted the word ‘worker’ in section 23(2) of the 
Constitution6 to include members of the Defence Force. As a result, the right to 
form and join a trade union was extended to members of the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF). As a result, military trade unions received full 
recognition in the Defence Force. However, in some quarters, allowing trade 
unions in the military was and still is regarded as an affront to national security and 
military discipline and good order in the Defence Force. 
National security 
National security is a broad concept but for our purposes here, it is 
restricted to raising and maintaining an effective military force to defend the 
country against external military threats. As in other countries, national security is 
a constitutional matter in South Africa. The concept of national security deals with 
our actual survival as a nation. It also deals with those things that as a nation we 
                                                          
1 Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
2 S 23(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
3 S 23(2)(b) ibid. 
4 S 23(2)(c) ibid. 
5 1999 (6) BCLR 615. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
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must do and those that we must not do in order for us to survive. For this country, 
to achieve national security objectives, some of the fundamental governing 
principles is to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear 
and want, and to seek a better life.7 In its restricted form, national security concerns 
those matters which deal with national defence of our country or refers to the 
defence and protection of South Africa from any attack or other dangers by having 
an adequate and coherent military force – the South African National Defence 
Force. In order to ensure national security, the authors of our Constitution 
established a single Defence Force as one of the security services8 with a specific 
primary mandate or object. 
The mandate of the SANDF 
Military forces are purposive instruments, which are “rationally conceived 
to fulfill certain objects the principal of which is to fight and win wars”.9 These 
forces have the monopoly of arms.10 Therefore, one of the highest obligations a 
country may place on its citizens is the obligation to defend and protect the 
motherland, its territorial integrity and its people from military threats, which may 
emanate from either the external or the internal environments. Whether military 
threats exist or not, states develop national security policies “that are intended to 
provide security by lowering the probability that the attack will occur”.11 South 
Africa did just that. This leads us to the primary object of our Defence Force, “to 
defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance 
with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of 
force”.12 This provision of the Constitution makes the Defence Force one of the 
primary instruments of national power in ensuring national security and the only 
instrument of power which may apply coercion to defend and protect the nation. 
This means that members of the Defence Force are not only expected to fight in 
defence of the country but to die for it, which is a supreme sacrifice.  
 
                                                          
7 These are some of the governing principles of national security found in s 198 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Finer, SE The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (2009) at 7. 
10 Ibid 5. 
11 Baldwin, DA ‘The Concept of Security’ (1997) 23 Review of International Studies at 13. 
12 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
132 
A disciplined defence force  
From the principal purpose13 of military forces follow centralised 
command, hierarchy, discipline, esprit de corps, etc.14 without which the army 
cannot win wars. For the SANDF to execute this constitutional mandate, it has to 
be a disciplined, credible and coherent military force. The authors of our 
Constitution realised the importance of the Defence Force in ensuring our national 
security and placed an obligation that such Defence Force must be structured and 
managed as a disciplined military force.15 Without discipline and coherence within 
the ranks the SANDF, it will not be able to fulfil its constitutional mandate of 
defending and protecting South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people and in 
turn of ensuring national security by applying the modern and state-of-the-art 
equipment the taxpayer may acquire for it. Ill discipline or perceived ill discipline 
within the ranks of any military force undermines the purpose of establishing it, 
namely to defend and protect the country when the need arises. Such ill discipline 
may undermine our national security because South Africa may not have a credible 
and dependable force on which to rely when needed the most. 
There are indicators which show that unionisation of our military 
undermines coherence within the ranks of the Defence Force, which may in turn 
undermine the capacity of the Defence Force as an instrument of national power to 
execute its constitutional mandate. The importance of cohesion within a military 
force cannot be underestimated. In this regard, Von Clausewitz16 says: 
[I]t would be a serious mistake to underrate professional pride (esprit de 
corps) as something that may and must be present in an army to greater or 
lesser degree. Professional pride is the bond between the various natural 
forces that activate the military virtues; in the context of this professional 
pride they cristalize more readily. An army that maintains its cohesion 
under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears 
and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that [is] proud of its 
victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust 
for its officers even in defeat … such an army is imbued with the true 
military spirit. 
                                                          
13 For the principal purpose of military forces, cf. Finer op cit 7. 
14 Ibid. 
15 S 202(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
16 Howard, M Carl Von Clausewitz on War (Princeton 1989) at 187. 
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Allowing soldiers to form and join unions also undermines the esprit de 
corps among some elements of the Defence Force. That happened in 1999 when 
South Africa allowed the Defence Force to be unionised. This happened after the 
Constitutional Court ruled, “soldiers like any other citizens have the right to 
freedom of expression and to form and join military unions”. It is said, “the 
unionization of military personnel has been viewed as conflicting with the unique 
nature of the military and its role in maintaining national security and public 
order”.17  
I respectfully submit that through the courts – including the Constitutional 
Court – South Africa should not have allowed the unionisation of the Defence 
Force. As the 26 August 200918experience showed us, the unionisation of our 
Defence Force did not only undermine military discipline and coherence among 
members of the Defence force; it also led to a tendency of undermining national 
security. For instance, what will happen when the president as head of national 
executive declares a state of national defence19 and members of a military trade 
union go on strike or organise a march as they did on 26 August 2009? Without 
any doubt, that will undermine our national security. 
To a certain extent, unionisation of the Defence Force has created some 
divided loyalties. There is a perception that some members – especially those who 
are members of some trade unions – have divided loyalty. They are loyal to those 
trade unions and to the Defence Force. Divided loyalties are a recipe for disaster in 
any military force. No matter how noble the cause, how brilliant the plan and how 
inferior the adversary’s weapons, an army with divided loyalties cannot defeat 
even the most inferior adversary. Members of the Defence Force do not have to 
have divided loyalties. They must be loyal only to the country they serve and the 
Defence Force of which they are members. For the Defence Force to be a credible 
military force that is able to execute its constitutional mandate, divided loyalties 
should be avoided at all cost. 
Members of the Defence Force must have undivided loyalty to the people 
of the Republic. When they join the Defence Force, they forgo one of the most 
                                                          
17 ‘Military Unions and Associations’ in Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel (2008) Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/31393?download=true  
18 When some members of the Defence Force marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria, 
which march led to the destruction of property in the area.  
19 In terms of the provisions of s 203(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996. 
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important rights, which is enshrined in the Bill of Rights – the right to life – so that 
others can enjoy all these rights. For South Africans and others who live in South 
Africa to enjoy these rights, South Africa must have a sense of national security 
and the capacity to be protected from possible attacks by potential adversaries. 
Potential adversaries may create or exploit the existing gaps to undermine 
coherence among members of the Defence Force thereby undermining the capacity 
of the Defence Force to defend and protect the country. That, in turn, will 
jeopardise and undermine the country’s national security. 
Command and control 
In the military, command and control is a domain of military leadership. 
For any military force to function properly, command and control should therefore 
never be shared with any organisation including military trade unions. Military 
trade unions have a tendency of diluting command and control of the Defence 
Force. For example, in the recent past, South Africa witnessed situations where 
military trade unions pronounced themselves on issues of command and control. 
This undermines our national security because no military force can be a credible 
force if it is not clear from where and from whom soldiers receive their commands. 
There is also a tendency on the side of the unions to pronounce themselves on 
operational matters in theatre operations, thereby endangering lives of our troops.  
Limitation of rights 
What we must ask is whether or not soldiers’ right to form and join a trade 
union may be limited by the constitutional obligation imposed on the Defence 
Force to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people. 
Fulfilling this obligation more often than not will lead to loss of lives of some 
members of the Defence Force. By implication, in executing this constitutional 
obligation, soldiers’ right to life as enshrined in the Constitution is limited by the 
common good, i.e. the defence of the Republic. The right to life is the most 
important of all rights and all other rights depend on. If this right (the soldier’s 
right to life) may be limited by sending members of the Defence Force to war in 
defence or protection of the Republic or in peacekeeping operations knowing very 
well that some may be killed, why is the soldier’s right to form and join a trade 
union not limited in the interest of national security?  
Some rights into the Bill of Rights are not absolute. They may be limited 
only in terms of the law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
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rights, equality and freedom.20 I submit that the right to form and join a military 
trade union may be limited constitutionally by the same constitutional obligations 
placed upon the Defence Force – the defence and protection of the Republic, its 
territorial integrity and its people as a primary mandate of the Defence Force.  
As a nation, it should be in our character and a national habit to avoid or 
correct those decisions which may have unintended consequences, such as 
undermining our national security. Therefore, in the interest of our common good – 
our national security – government should adopt a policy that prevents the 
unionisation of the country’s military forces. Soldiers’ right to form and join 
military trade unions has to be limited by the law of general application. By de-
unionising the military, we will be doing our country as much good as we can. The 
nation must undo the harm, which was caused by the unionisation of the Defence 
Force which, in some instances, led to the paralysis of command and control.  
What is the way forward? 
Matters of national security, as they deal among other things with the 
defence and protection of our country, its territorial integrity and its people, should 
not treated lightly. If we as the nation treat these issues lightly, we will wake up 
one day without at united, credible and formidable Defence Force on which the 
nation may rely in times of need. In addition, certain elements within the military 
may one day intervene directly or indirectly in politics of the country thereby 
threatening our national security. Therefore, South Africans should heed the call to 
de-unionise the Defence Force in order to prevent such eventualities. Those who do 
not listen to advice often find themselves in troubles that they should have avoided, 
i.e. ngoana mahanajoetsoa o mmona ka dikgapha.21 
Of concern to the writer is the ambivalence of South Africans on the issue 
of whether or not soldiers should be allowed to form and join military unions. For a 
very long time, this has been left to the leadership of the Defence Force alone. In 
my view, this should not be an SANDF concern; it should be our collective 
concern as South Africans. This means South Africans, including the three arms of 
the State, viz Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary, should be in unison 
when it comes to issues of national security. 
                                                          
20 S 36(1) ibid. 
21 This is a SeSotho idiom which, when loosely translated, means that a stubborn person who 
does not listen when he or she is being advised usually finds him- or herself being hurt 
and crying.  
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In the interests on national security, military discipline and good order 
within the military ranks, we, the people of South Africa, regardless of our political 
affiliations, should take a brave and decisive decision to de-unionise the SANDF. 
This can be done by amending section 200 of the Constitution by inserting a new 
subsection (2) which, in the interest of national security, will forbid members of the 
Defence Force from forming or joining military trade unions.  
Instead of military trade unions, South Africans might consider allowing 
soldiers to form or join professional associations, which will represent soldiers’ 
interests related to working conditions. The professional associations should not 
have any political objectives and should not engage in any industrial action.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
In 1999, the Constitutional Court held that members of the Defence Force 
may be regarded as workers; therefore, they are entitled to form and join military 
unions. Allowing soldiers to form and join military trade unions is an affront to 
national security in that it undermines the constitutional obligation of the Defence 
Force, which is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its 
people. Union activities tend to undermine and harm military discipline, cohesion 
and the professional pride (esprit de corps) of our military, and at times interfere 
with the command and control responsibilities of commanders. 
Currently, there is ambivalence on whether the country needs its military to 
be unionised. In the interest of national security, it is recommended that South 
Africa should de-unionise the Defence Force. The country should adopt a policy, 
which prohibits the unionisation of the Defence Force. Then the Department of 
Defence should consider approaching the Constitutional Court to reconsider its 
previous decision where it was decided that the word ‘worker’ in section 23(2) of 
the Constitution includes members of the Defence Force. 
It is my opinion that the Constitutional Court should be able to change its 
decision on the previous case if the situation in the new case warrants a new 
finding. This might be the case if the social, political and security situation has 
changed since the previous decision or if following the previous decision might 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute or if that might cause untold 
suffering to the beneficiaries of certain rights in the Bill of Rights. The soldiers’ 
march to the Union Buildings in 2009 and the subsequent destruction of property 
and other violent strikes by other unions in the country brought about that change. 
Therefore, there is a compelling case for the Department of Defence to approach 
the Constitutional Court to revisit its previous decision.   
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If the Department of Defence fails to convince the Constitutional Court to 
change its previous decision, the department could approach Parliament to change 
the decision of the Constitutional Court by amending the Constitution to prohibit 
members of the Defence Force from forming and joining any trade union. This can 
be done by amending section 200 of the Constitution by inserting a new sub-
section (2) and the current sub-section 2 to become a new sub-section 3. Therefore, 
the proposed section 200 of the Constitution should read as follows: 
 
(1) The Defence Force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military 
force.  
[(2)] [Members of the Defence Force are prohibited to – 
(a) form and join a trade union; 
(b) participate in the activities or programmes of a trade union; and 
(c) strike.] 
[(3)] The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the 
Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution 
and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.  
Amending the Constitution in this fashion will put to rest the debate on 
whether or not members of the Defence Force are ‘workers’ as envisaged in the 
provisions of section 23(2) of the Constitution22 or put differently, it will answer 
the question whether soldiers could be members of the Defence Force and workers 
at the same time, 
The proposed amendment may be brought about in terms of section 74(3) 
of the Constitution.23 This requires that a Bill amending this provision be passed by 
the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
members. Because this matter does not affect the National Council of Provinces or 
alter provincial boundaries, powers, etc., the vote of the National Council of 
Provinces will not be necessary. 
The current military leadership is constrained by the shrinking budget 
allocation of the Department of Defence. The ever-declining defence budget does 
not only affect the ability of the Defence Force to acquire new and advanced 
weapon systems but it also negatively affects soldiers’ standard of living. The 
conditions of service of soldiers are not where the Defence Force would like them 
to be. South Africa needs to conduct a study to look at the possibility of 
establishing occupation-specific military professional associations, which must be 
                                                          
22 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
23 Ibid. 
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affiliated under an umbrella body that will look after the interests of members of 
the Defence Force, e.g. to bargain for better service conditions for members of the 
Defence Force.  
Soldiers, regardless of rank, do not have time and skills to look after and 
protect their socio-economic interests. They need an independent body which will 
lobby for their interests and advise government on what the implications of 
adopting certain policies will be. Such a body must respect the chain of command. 
Unlike military unions, such associations must be forbidden to participate in any 
industrial action or to be affiliated to any federation of trade unions. 
It is recommended that the Defence Act24 be amended to establish and 
regulate independent and apolitical occupation-specific military professional 
associations. This will ensure that soldiers’ constitutional right to freedom of 
association25 is guaranteed and respected at all times without undermining 
operational efficiency of the Defence Force. This will also remove the need for 
soldiers to join military trade unions as the guarantors of their constitutional rights.  
In 2012, Parliament passed legislation that established the Office of the 
Military Ombud.26 The object of the Office is to investigate and ensure that 
complaints are resolved in a fair, economical and expeditious manner.27 However, 
according to its mandate, this office is not proactive in nature in that complaints 
regarding members’ conditions of service have to be lodged for it to investigate.28 
The office is very effective and efficient in dealing with soldiers’ grievances but, 
sadly, it is constrained by its mandate to be reactive. 
Military professional associations will be mutually beneficial to both the 
state and soldiers. On the one hand, there will be efficiency of command and 
control and of military operations because there will be no trade unions which 
compete for membership and allegiance of members of the Defence Force. On the 
other hand, soldiers will have a voice on socio-economic issues that directly affect 
                                                          
24 Act 42 of 2002 (as amended). 
25 As guaranteed by s 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. 
26 The Military Ombud Act 4 of 2012. 
27 S 3 The Military Ombud Act 4 of 2012. 
28 S 4 (I) The mandate of Office is to investigate complaints lodged in writing by-  
(a) a member regarding his or her conditions of service; 
(b) a former member regarding his or her conditions of service;  
(c) a member of the public regarding the official conduct of a member of the Defence 
Force; or  
(d) a person acting on behalf of a member. 
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them. These associations have to be proactive in nature – they must be a force 
multiplier to government’s endeavours to improve soldiers’ conditions of serve. 
The state needs to pay some serious consideration to the South African soldiers’ 
standard of living. Soldiers’ quality of life needs to be improved to eradicate the 
need for them to join military trade unions. Notwithstanding that they are subject to 
the Defence Act,29 for salary matters, members of the Defence Force are 
considered public servants. As a result, their posts or military ranks are equated to 
civilian posts and they receive the same salary as their civilian counterparts. In 
order to improve soldiers’ quality of life, government must consider delinking 
military ranks from civilian posts. 
Soldiers are the most important national security asset that South Africa 
has. Their willingness to fight and die in defence of the country, when the need 
arises, will depend largely on the way they are led and looked after by those in 
leadership positions. When they are well led and well looked after, they are an 
indispensable asset but when they are not, they are just soldiers. Look after them 
and they will look after your country in times of need.  
                                                          
29 Act 42 of 2002 (as amended). 
